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This article analyzes the policy and legal challenges to building an international
environmental enforcement and compliance cooperation network. Part I outlines
the possible components of a successful network. Part II presents an analytical
framework for such a network. Part III reviews the evolution of the environmental
enforcement network in North America, including the North American Free
Trade Agreement's side agreement on the environment and the establishment of
the North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation. And finally,
Part V looks to the future evolution of a North American and Western Hemisphere
environmental enforcement network.
I. The Challenge and Opportunity of a North American Environmental
Enforcement Network
The United States, Mexico, and Canada have committed themselves to strength-
ening environmental enforcement and compliance within each nation, as well as
to providing mutual support and cooperation in carrying out this mission. In
recent years, the three countries have begun exploring a variety of ways in which
cooperation can enhance their ability to address environmental problems. The
three countries are now presented with an important opportunity to enhance their
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environmental protection capabilities through new international arrangements
that formalize an evolving network of enforcement and compliance cooperation.
The entry into force of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
marks an era of challenge and opportunity to achieve environmental protection
in North America. NAFTA's promise of increased commerce brings with it a
potential increase in domestic and transboundary environmental risks. To prevent
unfair trade advantages that might arise from inadequate application of environ-
mental laws, free trade requires a level playing field of effective enforcement
of each country's environmental laws. NAFTA's innovative environmental side
agreement, the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
(NAAEC),' establishes ground-breaking commitments to address the environ-
mental challenges of regional free trade. At the same time, the NAAEC creates an
institutional framework for building on past experiences to develop increasingly
sophisticated and effective cooperative environmental enforcement and compli-
ance.
These developments in North America are complemented by expanded environ-
mental cooperation in the western hemisphere as a whole. The vision of a hemi-
sphere-wide free trade zone was heralded at the Summit of the Americas in Miami
in December 1994. At the same time, the leaders of the western hemisphere's
democratic nations committed to developing the hemisphere-wide Partnership
for Pollution Prevention to stimulate international cooperation in, among other
things, strengthening environmental protection frameworks and mechanisms for
implementation and enforcement. The experience of enforcement cooperation in
North America suggests a range of new possibilities for similar networks to
develop in the Western hemisphere and around the globe.
II. Building an Environmental Enforcement Network
This section offers an analytical framework for developing international net-
works of cooperation in environmental enforcement and compliance2 by describ-
ing several possible key components. Many of these components are suggested
by past experience in the field in North America; others are yet to be fully utilized,
but show promise in enhancing the effectiveness of enforcement cooperation in
North America and the Western hemisphere.
A. RESPECT FOR NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY
Law enforcement is a unique attribute of national sovereignty. The environmen-
tal inspector represents the power of the state to impose order through the rule
1. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993, U.S.-Can.-
Mex., 32 I.L.M. 1480.
2. The term enforcement, as used in this article, includes actions taken by governments to detect
and respond to violations of environmental laws and regulations (including imposing sanctions and
requiring violations and their consequences to be corrected and remediated), as well as actions taken
by governments to promote or encourage compliance with such laws and regulations.
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of law, a function that properly lies within the exclusive territorial jurisdiction of
individual nations. Thus, respect for national sovereignty must be a fundamental
principle in developing a network of cooperation in environmental enforcement
and compliance. The challenge is to build a network of cooperation that maximizes
the capacity of each country to enforce or stimulate compliance with its environ-
mental laws, that responds to transboundary effects of pollution, and that is solidly
based on the principles of sovereignty and comity.
B. INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS FOR COOPERATION
Although international cooperation on environmental enforcement often devel-
ops on an ad hoc basis, a rational institutional framework for cooperation can
enhance the success of an international enforcement and compliance network.
Mechanisms for cooperation may be formally created by international agreement,
or they may be informal. Attention to the rational design of such institutions is
needed on all levels of interaction: multilaterally, bilaterally, and internally among
agencies at the national and political subdivision levels.
An effective enforcement cooperation network combines partnership among
the various actors within and among each government, empowering all stakehold-
ers in the enforcement outcome. Institutions for cooperation can be structured
to allow participation by all relevant agencies. These institutions could include
national and local environmental authorities, together with agencies responsible
for customs, transportation, and criminal law enforcement. The institutions can
also be structured to promote cooperation among equivalent authorities of the
countries involved. At the same time, they can be designed to account for different
organizational structures and levels of centralization among the governments.
C. COOPERATION IN SOLVING ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS
Cooperative relationships in environmental enforcement often develop in re-
sponse to specific environmental problems. Transboundary environmental prob-
lems, for example, provide a natural backdrop for developing a network of cooper-
ation. Countries also often have parallel domestic environmental problems. For
example, they may have similar industries that emit the same types of pollutants
and that are sometimes owned by common multinational corporations. Thus,
enforcement cooperation may be of assistance in helping each country solve even
wholly domestic environmental problems. The possible types of cooperation are
many, depending on the type of environmental problem.
1. Strategic Priority Setting and Targeting
By establishing common goals, priorities, and strategies for using enforcement
tools to address common environmental problems, countries can maximize the
impact that their enforcement actions will have on compliance in their respective
jurisdictions. Industry will be more likely to comply with the law of the jurisdiction
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in which it operates when its managers know that the governments have adopted a
conscious, cooperative strategy to mutually enhance their respective enforcement
capacities.
Countries may address local transboundary environmental problems through
a common resolve to focus enforcement resources on a particular type of pollutant,
industry, environmental requirement, or sensitive transboundary ecosystem.
Countries may also demonstrate their common resolve to address environmental
problems caused by similar types of operations in each country, even where
transboundary impacts are not apparent. Accordingly, coordination in strategic
priority setting may be appropriate following an agreement by the countries to
harmonize and upgrade their environmental standards applicable to a particular
industry or category. This kind of sector-based cooperation and targeting can
help to ensure the level playing field required for free trade between sovereign
nations.
Strategic cooperation requires a high degree of sensitivity to a country's con-
cerns that joint decisions about enforcement targets may be seen as compromising
its national sovereignty. This problem can be avoided through the mutual determi-
nation of common priorities by the parties involved, followed by the implementa-
tion of these priorities by each country's exercise of its own enforcement authority.
Through independent enforcement actions within its own territory, each country
maintains respect for the exclusive territorial jurisdiction of the other countries.
Countries may cooperate in developing information to identify common environ-
mental problems, but unilaterally choose a different mix of tools to address
the problem. Enforcement represents one such tool that countries may employ
independently and with differing degrees of emphasis relative to other tools such
as compliance promotion activities.
2. Cooperative Compliance Promotion
Countries may benefit from cooperative efforts to encourage voluntary compli-
ance by industry. Countries may choose to collaborate in encouraging multina-
tional corporations to ensure that their foreign operations comply with the host
country's environmental laws, to undertake environmental compliance audits,
or to initiate voluntary plant or management improvements that exceed environ-
mental standards and prevent pollution at the source. Additionally, countries
may cooperate in developing and presenting technical compliance information
to common industries that operate domestically within each of the countries.
3. Cooperative Compliance Monitoring
Cooperation may be particularly useful in routine monitoring to detect viola-
tions. For example, the transboundary movement of hazardous substances,
wastes, and other regulated products provides a perfect forum for development
of cooperative links. Monitoring of ambient air, water, and groundwater quality
in one country's jurisdiction may also provide useful data to identify violations
VOL. 30, NO. 1
ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT 115
committed by facilities in a neighboring jurisdiction. Technology can play an
essential role in developing mutual capacity to detect violations, such as through
collaboration in developing electronic databases and direct electronic data re-
porting capabilities for tracking transboundary shipments of regulated materials. 3
4. Cooperation on Specific Enforcement Cases
The enforcement authorities of different countries may assist each other in
investigations of specific violations. Such cooperation may facilitate enforcement
of environmental requirements for transboundary shipments of hazardous wastes,
toxic chemicals, pesticides, and vehicles when materials found in one country
provide evidence of a violation of another country's laws. Cooperation may also
be desired when transboundary effects of air or water pollution provide evidence
of a violation in the country where the pollution originated, or when a foreign
corporation exerts management control over a local subsidiary that is in violation
of the host country's laws.
In addition to case investigations, cooperation may assist in fashioning appro-
priate remedies for violations. Violations in one country may cause environmental
threats in another, requiring cooperation to ensure that adequate authorities act
to redress injuries that cross international borders.4 A sound enforcement network
can provide for cooperation at every stage of case development, from initial
investigations to implementation of enforcement remedies.
5. Sharing Experiences to Build Enforcement Capacity
The countries in an enforcement network may be able to enhance their enforce-
ment capacity by sharing their experiences and by taking advantage of the econo-
mies of scale provided by combined capacity-building efforts.
a. Consultation on Laws and Policies
Countries may be able to learn from their different approaches to, and experi-
ences in, environmental regulation and enforcement. Consultations among coun-
tries to learn about each others' environmental laws and policies for responding
to violations can enhance mutual capacity-building. An enforcement network
may involve formal exchanges, such as joint seminars and conferences, as well
as the informal exchange that will come with increased collaborative efforts on
enforcement matters.
3. See D.S. Schwarz, Moving Data Electronically: The Opportunity and Challenges of Elec-
tronic Data Interchange (EDI) (June 13, 1994) (unpublished manuscript presented at the 86th Annual
Meeting and Exhibition of the Air and Waste Management Association, on file with the authors).
4. See News Release from Los Angeles County, California, District Attorney (June 15, 1993)
(transcript on file with the authors) (announcing settlement of criminal environmental prosecution
for violations to California hazardous waste laws, including a US$2 million payment for cleanup of
wastes unlawfully transported to Mexico).
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b. Training and Technical Assistance
Technical cooperation in the development of tools and technologies for identi-
fying environmental violations may enhance each country's enforcement capac-
ity. Cooperative training in the principles of environmental enforcement and in
the techniques of environmental inspection provide similar opportunities. Inspec-
tors of one country may be invited as observers or trainers during inspections
within another country's territory, at facilities, or at border crossings. Such field
training exercises can occur without compromising the sovereignty of the govern-
ment in whose territory the facility lies. For example, it can be made clear to
all parties that the foreign trainer's or trainee's presence is solely to observe or
provide technical instruction, and that he or she is not present to exercise inspec-
tion authority.
6. Sharing Information on Enforcement Results
Cooperative sharing and public disclosure of information on enforcement activ-
ities can facilitate dialogue on the role of enforcement in addressing environmental
problems. Sharing information about enforcement results will encourage the
countries to develop tools for evaluating program success. It will also enable the
countries to learn from each others' efforts in this area. One challenge will be
to address the comparability of methods employed in each of the countries to
account for the results and accomplishments of environmental enforcement activi-
ties.
C. COMMUNICATIONS STRATEGY
Coordinated communication to the public of the cooperative activities under-
taken by the countries has great potential to encourage compliance behavior.
Effective communication of cooperative enforcement activity can maximize the
efficiency of limited enforcement resources by discouraging companies from
committing future environmental violations. Coordinated announcements can
achieve economies of scale in encouraging compliance by getting the message to
a wider audience that governments are cooperating to enhance their enforcement
capacities and address violations.
III. The Emergence of a North American Environmental
Enforcement Network
The United States, Mexico, and Canada have begun to experiment with many
of the components of enforcement cooperation outlined in the previous section.
This section reviews the evolution of North America's environmental enforcement
network to date, beginning with bilateral cooperative efforts, and leading up to
the creation of a new, trilateral institutional structure for enforcement cooperation.
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A. U.S./MEXICAN ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION
Environmental cooperation between the United States and Mexico began in
the late nineteenth century, with an early focus on protecting water resources.
In 1944, the United States and Mexico entered the Treaty on the Utilization of
Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers, and of the Rio Grande.5 This Treaty
established the International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC), which
has the authority to undertake projects dealing with water quality and conservation
on transboundary rivers. The IBWC also serves as a vehicle for water quality
monitoring and data collection, and has limited jurisdiction over groundwater.
In 1983, the United States and Mexico entered into an Agreement on Coopera-
tion for Protection and Improvement of the Environment in the Border Area
(the La Paz Agreement).6 The La Paz Agreement provides a framework for
cooperation between the two countries on protecting the environment in the 100-
kilometer area on each side of the international boundary. Since 1983, the United
States and Mexico have negotiated five annexes to the La Paz Agreement, ad-
dressing themes such as border sanitation problems, emergency planning for
responding to pollution accidents, air pollution problems, and transboundary
movement of hazardous wastes.
Cooperative projects under the La Paz Agreement are implemented through
a series of binational work groups. Originally, four work groups were set up to
address air, water, emergency response, and hazardous waste. In 1991 and 1992,
two additional work groups were created to address pollution prevention and
cooperative enforcement strategy.
1. Early Enforcement Cooperation Experience:
Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Waste
The initial U.S./Mexican cooperative relationship on environmental enforce-
ment under the La Paz Agreement centered on the transboundary movement of
hazardous waste. Mexican law requires foreign companies operating maquila-
dora7 facilities to return hazardous wastes to the country of origin of the raw
materials. Mexico accepts substantial quantities of hazardous waste from the
U.S. steel industry for recycling, but prohibits hazardous waste imports for dis-
5. Treaty on the Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and the Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio
Grande, Feb. 3, 1994, U.S.-Mex., 59 Stat. 1219.
6. Agreement on Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement of the Environment in the
Border Area, Aug. 14, 1983, U.S.-Mex., T.I.A.S. No. 10,827 [hereinafter La Paz Agreement].
7. Mexico established its maquiladora program in the 1960s to encourage foreign investment.
The maquiladora industry serves as an export platform for goods produced in Mexico from imported
raw materials. A maquiladora facility may import raw materials to Mexico without paying import
duties on the condition that resulting products and wastes are then shipped back to the country of
origin of the raw materials. For products made from raw materials originating in the United States,
the United States requires the importer to pay the duty only on the value added to the raw materials
during their use in the maquiladora operation. A large number of maquiladora plants in Mexico
are wholly or partially owned by U.S. parent corporations.
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posal. This two-way flow of waste between Mexico and the United States gave
rise to a cooperative relationship in both countries' efforts to enforce their hazard-
ous waste export and import laws.
Under annex III to the La Paz Agreement, negotiated in 1986, the United
States and Mexico agreed to ensure enforcement of their respective domestic
laws for transboundary shipments of hazardous waste and to provide mutual
assistance to increase the capability of each party to enforce its laws applicable
to transboundary shipments.8 The annex calls for a program of cooperation,
including exchange of information from monitoring and spot-checking of trans-
boundary shipments. 9
The United States and Mexico focused their early efforts on developing a joint
capacity to monitor transboundary waste shipments in accordance with these
bilateral commitments. These efforts culminated in the development of a bina-
tional Hazardous Waste Tracking System, known as HAZTRAKS. A first-of-its-
kind effort, the system matches information from both countries tracking trans-
boundary waste shipments. It provides a useful tool for monitoring compliance
with both countries' requirements and identifying possible violations.' ° The
United States and Mexico also began to cooperate in promoting industry compli-
ance with both countries' transboundary waste shipment requirements through
an annual maquiladora conference and regular outreach to the maquiladora plants
and their U.S. parent corporations.
2. Toward a Cooperative Enforcement Strategy
The disposition of hazardous waste from the maquiladora industry became a
central focus of public concern during the debate in the United States over the
NAFTA. The public feared that the U.S.-owned maquiladoras could escape
expensive U.S. compliance costs by dumping their wastes illegally in Mexico
instead of complying with Mexico's requirement to return them to the United
States. In addition to posing severe environmental risks to Mexico, such practices
were thought likely to result in environmental harm in the United States through
transboundary surface water, groundwater, and air pollution. Public concern
about maquiladora compliance with transboundary waste shipment requirements
was indicative of a broader concern over the potential impact on a company's
decision where to locate its plant due to differential enforcement practices once
tariff barriers to international trade were lowered between the United States and
Mexico.
8. La Paz Agreement, supra note 6.
9. Annex III to the United States and Mexico Border Environment Agreement, Regarding
the Transboundary Shipments of Hazardous Wastes and Hazardous Substances, Nov. 12, 1986,
U.S.-Mex., arts. II, XII, T.I.A.S. No. 11,269.
10. See S.E. Bromm, The United States' Enforcement Approach to the Export and Import of
Hazardous Waste (Apr. 25, 1994) (unpublished manuscript presented at the Proceedings of the Third
International Conference on Environmental Enforcement, on file with the authors).
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In 1991 the United States and Mexico added to the La Paz Agreement work
groups a new work group on cooperative enforcement strategy (enforcement
work group). The new enforcement work group was created to coordinate and
focus attention on cross-cutting enforcement issues with the goal of mutually
enhancing enforcement capacity while respecting national sovereignty and juris-
diction. The Integrated Environmental Plan for the Mexican-U.S. Border Area
(First Stage, 1992-1994) called for the enforcement work group to implement a
cooperative enforcement strategy that emphasizes focusing enforcement actions
by each government against priority targets; promoting pollution prevention and
waste minimization as a principal goal of enforcement; and cooperating in the
development of a communications capability, using the stigma of unfavorable
publicity to encourage industries to avoid the risks of noncompliance."1
a. Cooperative Targeting and Communication Strategy
In June 1992, Mexico and the United States announced the first cooperative
effort at targeting enforcement actions. 12 The actions were focused in the border
area, which demonstrates that environmental compliance in the border area was
a common priority. Mexico announced that in conducting forty-two inspections
it found violations at twenty-two facilities, which resulted in eight shut-down
orders and four performance bond forfeitures. 13 On the same day, the United
States announced that it had undertaken fifteen civil judicial and administrative
enforcement actions and issued two criminal indictments.14 The U.S. cases re-
sulted in collection of at least $273,800 in civil and criminal penalties, as well
as imposition of environmental restitution and cleanup requirements. These cases
also produced agreements by facilities to undertake supplemental environmental
projects such as facility audits or process/management changes to reduce pollution
beyond that required by regulations. In addition, this initial effort at cooperative
targeting of enforcement activities by both countries provided good experience
in coordinating efforts to communicate enforcement results.
b. Cooperative Training and Technical Assistance
In June 1992, Mexico reorganized its environmental enforcement authorities
into a new Secretariat of Social Development (SEDESOL), with an independent
Attorney General's Office for Environmental Protection (PROFEPA) in charge
of SEDESOL's environmental inspectorate. PROFEPA turned to the initial task
of reforming and upgrading its environmental inspectorate and launched an ag-
gressive program of inspections, enforcement actions, and compliance audits.
11. Integrated Environmental Plan for the Mexican-U.S. Border Area (First Stage, 1992-1994)
vols. 3-7 (Feb. 1992).
12. Joint Progress Report of the United States-Mexico Integrated Border Environmental Plan,
Annual Meeting of the National Coordinators, La Paz Agreement, at 3 (Ensenada, Baja California,
Mexico, Oct. 1993) (on file with the authors).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 2.
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Cooperative training and technical assistance between Mexico and the United
States helped PROFEPA build its enforcement capacity. From 1992 to 1994, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) conducted seven multi-media inspector
training courses and a train-the-trainer workshop, providing training to 561 PRO-
FEPA inspectors and supporting Mexico's efforts to develop an in-house training
capacity. Additional enforcement-related cooperative training efforts during this
period included training PROFEPA inspectors in the use of aerial surveillance
to identify potential waste disposal sites, environmental impact assessment tech-
niques, volatile organic compound inspection techniques, and hazardous waste
inspector training. In addition, the EPA developed a bilingual training video for
customs inspectors on compliance with environmental controls of transboundary
shipments of hazardous waste.
In December 1994, Mexico's environmental authorities were reorganized and
consolidated into a new secretariat for Environment, Natural Resources, and Fish-
eries. PROFEPA was moved into the new secretariat, along with Mexico's Na-
tional Water Commission, which had retained water quality regulation compliance
authority. In late 1994 and in 1995, cooperative training activities increased and
diversified. The EPA and PROFEPA began cooperative efforts to provide bilingual
training to U.S. and Mexican customs and environmental inspectors in transbound-
ary waste shipment compliance, working closely with U.S. state environmental
authorities. By August 1995, bilingual trainings had been conducted at several cus-
toms facilities on the California and Texas borders, with plans to complete trainings
at most major land border crossings by the end of the year.
In May 1995, PROFEPA hosted the EPA for the presentation of a training
course on the principles of environmental enforcement for Mexican policy-
makers. This international training course was an intensive three-day course in
fundamental principles for designing and implementing environmental enforce-
ment programs. PROFEPA also participated in a training course on field investi-
gations, sampling, and analysis. This training course was provided in February
1995 by the Southern Environmental Enforcement Network, one of four regional
associations of state and federal environmental enforcement agencies that work
with the EPA in building domestic enforcement capacity in the United States.
c. Cooperative Compliance Monitoring and Case Investigations
U.S./Mexican case-specific cooperation continued to increase between 1992
and 1994. PROFEPA, the EPA, and state environmental agencies, particularly
for the California/Baja California and Texas/Tamaulipas areas, have met fre-
quently to coordinate investigatory activities. Cooperative case investigations
have resulted in the initiation of cleanup at several illegal waste sites in Mexico
and investigations into potential violations in both countries. 1
5
The United States and Mexico have worked to improve transboundary shipment
15. Id. at 3.
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surveillance efforts. In the past, U.S. officials set up visible border surveillence
teams and focused their surveillence efforts on occasional spot checks, often with
Mexican participation. Although these spot checks were an excellent field training
opportunity, they rarely detected significant violations because of their visibility
to would-be violators. The United States and the border states thus adopted a
new strategy of building their capacity for more routine detection of transboundary
shipment violations.
As a result of this new strategy, in San Diego County, California, a task force
of U.S. federal and state agencies arranged a meeting with U.S. and Mexican
customs in Tijuana in March 1992 to discuss hazardous waste inspection and
safety. This sparked increased binational customs coordination, which almost
immediately led to the U.S. indictment of an illegal hazardous waste exporter.
Since 1992, several additional cooperative investigations have been undertaken
involving shipments at several border crossings.
6
Promoting borderwide the kind of transboundary and interagency coordination
spearheaded by San Diego County's hazardous waste task force, the EPA began
funding U.S. border states in order to provide a routine presence of environmental
inspectors at border crossings, develop interagency task forces to enhance cooper-
ation, and encourage bilateral cooperation through joint field training and surveil-
lance exercises. These efforts have promise with respect to building a bilateral
partnership of agencies at all levels of government. 7
In the meantime, the hazardous waste work group under the La Paz Agreement
continued to develop HAZTRAKS into a premier binational compliance monitor-
ing system. The system first produced enforcement results in June of 1993, when
the United States filed a number of Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA) enforcement cases based on HAZTRAKS data. Since then, the EPA
has filed at least eight additional RCRA administrative enforcement cases devel-
oped from HAZTRAKS data, seeking more than $280,000 in penalties for viola-
tions of regulations pertaining to the import of hazardous waste. The EPA and
PROFEPA are working together to improve the utility of the database as a tool
for identifying violations of Mexican waste export requirements and targeting
maquiladora facilities suspected of failing to export their hazardous wastes. Sev-
eral industries are cooperating in the effort to improve HAZTRAKS by participat-
ing in a voluntary program to pilot the electronic transmission of hazardous waste
manifest data for maquiladora import shipments directly into the database.
In March 1995, the EPA won an important legal victory in its efforts to enforce
domestic regulations and provide cooperative assistance to Mexico in tracking
maquiladora hazardous waste imports. In 1991, the EPA had filed four adminis-
trative cases against hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal facilities
that receive maquiladora hazardous waste, alleging that these companies had
16. Id.
17. See Bromm, supra note 10.
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failed to comply with RCRA regulations requiring advance notice for the import of
hazardous waste from a foreign source. 8 One of the companies rejected settlement
efforts and argued before the EPA administrative law judge that maquiladora
hazardous wastes were not from a foreign source because, although maquiladoras
are generated outside of U.S. territory, they are often owned by U.S. parent
companies and use raw materials imported from the United States. The EPA
replied that the plain meaning of the EPA's regulations required advance notifica-
tion by facilities receiving waste generated by operations outside of the United
States. Moreover, the requirement of advance notification is essential in facilitat-
ing the EPA's efforts to track hazardous waste from Mexico and fulfill its obliga-
tion under annex III of the La Paz Agreement to provide Mexico with cooperative
assistance in tracking such waste and in building its capacity to enforce its laws,
including the requirement to return maquiladora-generated waste to the country
of origin of the raw materials. The administrative law judge ruled in favor of
the EPA,' 9 and the company filed an interlocutory appeal. In affirming the admin-
istrative law judge's opinion, the Environmental Appeals Board preserved the
integrity of the EPA's existing regulations as a tool for facilitating international
cooperation in tracking of hazardous waste shipments and assuring their compli-
ance with applicable laws and regulations.*°
d. Consultations and Exchange of Enforcement Results Data
The EPA and PROFEPA have begun mutual consultations on environmental
laws and enforcement policies. In March 1993, PROFEPA hosted a visit by EPA
lawyers, including enforcement attorneys, to gain a better understanding of Mexi-
co's environmental laws and its enforcement and environmental audits programs.
Since that initial exchange, the EPA and PROFEPA have consulted with one an-
other or have exchanged information on their respective policies for assessing mon-
etary penalties in enforcement cases, on administrative enforcement procedure,
on the development of programs for criminal environmental enforcement, on the
development of data systems to support enforcement efforts, and on policies and
programs to encourage voluntary compliance and promote environmental auditing.
Finally, the EPA and PROFEPA have been exchanging statistics on enforce-
ment activities and accomplishments. 2 This effort is providing experience in
dealing with the nations' differing methodologies of accounting for enforcement
activities and results. Differences in reporting capabilities and methodologies
18. 40 C.F.R. § 264.12(a) (1994).
19. In re Rollins Envtl. Serv. (TX), Inc., EPA Docket No. RCRA-VI-106-H (June 16, 1994)
(order denying motion for acceleration decision or alternative motion to dismiss).
20. In re Rollins Envtl. Serv. (TX), Inc., EPA Docket No. RCRA-VI-106-H, RCRA (3008)
Appeal No. 94-2 (Envtl. App. Bd., Mar. 10, 1995).
21. United States/Mexico Exchange of Enforcement Statistics (June 1995)
U.S. Enforcement Program in the Border Area:
In fiscal years 1992, 1993, and 1994, the EPA estimated that in the border region alone more
than 2,142 state inspections and 303 EPA inspections were executed at major facilities regulated
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were found to stem from the differing degrees of centralization, stages of develop-
ment, and remedies sought by the respective enforcement programs. This experi-
ence left both agencies with the recognition that the comparability of enforcement
statistics and the definition of common terms for articulating enforcement results
would present a challenge in the new North American Commission for Environ-
mental Cooperation.
e. Promoting Voluntary Compliance
At the time PROFEPA was created, it embarked on an innovative program to
allow companies to assure compliance through voluntary environmental auditing.
Participating companies may choose a qualified environmental auditor to conduct
a comprehensive environmental compliance audit. The audit is then reviewed
by a third-party supervisor, selected by PROFEPA. Any compliance deficiencies
identified as a result of the audit are presented to PROFEPA, which then negotiates
an enforceable agreement with the company for the company to come into compli-
ance. Voluntary participation in PROFEPA's environmental audit program pro-
vides companies an opportunity to demonstrate environmental leadership, identify
pollution prevention opportunities, and resolve compliance problems outside of
the adversarial context of an inspection visit. In May and June 1995, the EPA sent
letters to approximately forty U.S. parent companies of maquiladoras operating in
Mexico, encouraging them to examine Mexico's audit program and consider
providing their Mexican subsidiaries adequate resources to allow their participa-
tion in the program. The EPA and PROFEPA are following up these efforts with
industry technical seminars in key border locations to promote environmental
auditing and voluntary compliance.
f. U.S./Mexican Enforcement Cooperation to the Next Century
In June 1995, the U.S. and Mexican "national coordinators" under the La
Paz Agreement met in Mexico City to begin development of a new environmental
under the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, and
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act. During the same
period, 26 federal and 45 state civil judicial enforcement actions, and 130 federal and 89 state
administrative enforcement actions under all statutes administered by the EPA were initiated against
facilities in the border area. However, these statistics do not include criminal enforcement activities.
Mexican Enforcement Program:
From the creation of PROFEPA in August 1992, through September 1995, PROFEPA inspected
42,418 plants nationwide, ordering 1,838 partial facility shutdowns, 385 total shutdowns, and impos-
ing fines or requiring corrective measures for minor violations at an additional 29,856 facilities.
Much of this activity was concentrated in the border area of northern Mexico. From August 1992
to September 1995 PROFEPA inspected 8,278 border area facilities, imposing partial closures at
380 plants, total closures at 88, and fines or corrective orders at 6,190. Of these, 3,647 inspections
were at maquiladora facilities, resulting in 201 partial closures, 40 total closures, and 2,594 fines
or corrective orders for minor violations by maquiladoras. U.S./Mexico Enforcement Work Group,
Enforcement Work Group Achievements 1994-1995 (June 21, 1995) (unpublished report from the
Meeting of June 21, 1995, in Mexico City, on file with the authors); PROFEPA Inspection Statistics,
Oct. 10, 1995 (unpublished, on file with the authors).
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plan for the border area. The plan, which was dubbed Border XXI, includes the
following goals: increasing public participation in the planning process; stimulat-
ing decentralization and empowerment of state and local authorities on both sides
of the border to address environmental problems; and addressing environmental
problems in the border area with a more holistic perspective, which includes
increased attention to environmental health and natural resource issues and coordi-
nation with the other agencies that hold a stake in the process.
The meeting also provided an opportunity for the La Paz Agreement work
groups to coordinate their activities and develop work plans for the 1995-1996
period. First, the enforcement work group committed to enhanced cooperation
in all of the areas outlined in this article. Second, the EPA and PROFEPA commit-
ted to cooperative targeting of enforcement activities, addressing specific prob-
lems identified in the industrial sector through sharing of information to assist
in detecting noncompliance, planning, programming, realization of enforcement
activities, and technical support in specific cases. The two agencies agreed to
share information on enforcement results regularly and to improve the quality of
information exchanged about completed enforcement matters. Third, the agencies
committed to completing bilingual hazardous waste compliance training for cus-
toms and environmental inspectors at all major border crossings. Fourth, they
committed to continue efforts to assist PROFEPA in developing an in-house
inspector training capacity and to integrate water quality inspection information
into the EPA/PROFEPA multimedia inspector training course, reflecting the
consolidation of water quality, air, and hazardous waste compliance authorities
under a single secretariat. They also agreed to explore additional training in
the principles of environmental enforcement and to develop workshops in field
investigations and sampling. Fifth, the two agencies committed to additional
technical consultations, including a practical workshop on environmental enforce-
ment in both countries, further consultations on enforcement data systems, calcu-
lation of economic sanctions, and criminal environmental enforcement. Sixth,
the agencies committed to explore development of a protocol for cooperation
in investigating enforcement cases with transboundary aspects and to promote
coordination among the state and federal agencies on both sides of the border
through the development of multiagency task forces to ensure compliance with
transboundary shipment regulations. Finally, the EPA and PROFEPA committed
to a program of enhanced cooperation in promoting voluntary compliance and
environmental auditing through outreach to industry and intergovernmental con-
sultations on each country's policies and programs in this area.22
22. U.S./Mexico Enforcement Work Group, Cooperative Enforcement Strategy Work Group:
Work Plan (1995-1996) (June 21, 1995) (unpublished report from the Meeting of June 21, 1995,
in Mexico City, on file with the authors).
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B. U.S./CANADIAN ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION
1. Great Lakes Protection
Environmental cooperation between the United States and Canada, like that
between the United States and Mexico, began with a focus on transboundary
water resources. In 1909 the United States and Canada entered into the Boundary
Water Treaty, obligating the countries to cooperate in protecting the Great Lakes
and creating the International Joint Commission to coordinate and make recom-
mendations on such cooperation.23 The Boundary Water Treaty was updated in
1972 by the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement (GLWQA), setting forth a
framework for enhanced cooperation to protect the Great Lakes.24
A 1987 Protocol to the GLWQA called for the two countries, in consultation
with state and provincial governments, to designate areas of concern that have
been degraded by pollution. The protocol calls for the states and provinces to
develop and implement remedial action plans that detail plans for remediation
in each of the areas of concern. In addition, development of lakewide management
plans was required for implementation at the federal level with the goal of improv-
ing the quality of open lake waters.25
Much of the cooperative work to date under the GLWQA has focused on the
development, rather than enforcement, of new regulatory controls to protect the
Great Lakes from toxic discharges and on the implementation of nonregulatory
approaches that encourage pollution prevention and designate areas for special
protection.2 6 The GLWQA, however, provides a bilateral framework for coopera-
tive efforts in implementing common strategies for targeting violators and enforc-
ing the regulations developed by both countries to protect the Great Lakes.
a. Cooperative Priority-Setting; Unilateral Enforcement Targeting
Although the two countries have not yet engaged in cooperative enforcement
activities to target violations in the Great Lakes Basin, the EPA has undertaken
a number of unilateral enforcement initiatives as part of the U.S. strategy for
implementing the GLWQA.27 Discrete high-risk geographic areas are selected
23. Treaty on Boundary Water, Jan. 11, 1909, U.S.-Can., 36 Stat. 2448; see L. Peterson,
USEPA Regulation of Cross Boundary Pollution: The Great Lakes Initiative and Binational Pollution
Prevention Initiatives, 23 ENVTL. CONTROL L. No. 1 (1992).
24. See L. Peterson, The Great Lakes Enforcement Strategy: Using Enforcement Resources to
Maximize Risk Reduction and Environmental Restoration in the Great Lakes Basin (Apr. 25, 1994)
(unpublished manuscript presented at the Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Envi-
ronmental Enforcement, on file with the authors) [hereinafter Great Lakes Enforcement Strategy].
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Enforcement initiatives have focused on remediation of waste sites responsible for polluting
the Niagara River, issuing letters to thousands of facilities to promote the reporting of toxic releases,
conducting hundreds of inspections to check the adequacy of required oil spill containment plans, and
implementing inspection and enforcement actions to ensure compliance with the EPA's Underground
Storage Tank (UST) regulations. Peterson, supra note 20.
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for concentrated inspections and enforcement activity. An area may be selected
for geographic targeting based on its designation as an area of concern under
the GLWQA, among other factors.28
Enforcement targeting in the Great Lakes also has been linked to broader
pollution prevention and cleanup initiatives. In negotiating enforcement case set-
tlements, strong emphasis is placed on the violator committing to undertake
supplemental environmental projects such as remediating more pollution than
that for which the violator is directly responsible, or conducting environmental
audits leading to procedure or management changes to reduce pollution at its
source. The EPA has found that its leverage for negotiating meaningful pollution
prevention and cleanup projects is enhanced through multimedia enforcement
actions that allege violations of more than one U.S. statute and pollution to more
than one environmental medium in a single proceeding.29
2. Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Waste
The United States and Canada enjoy a history of growing cooperation in assur-
ing compliance with requirements pertaining to the transboundary movement of
hazardous wastes. In 1986, the two countries entered into an agreement concern-
ing the transboundary movement of hazardous waste. 30 The agreement obligates
both countries to ensure that their domestic laws are enforced within their respec-
tive jurisdictions and commits them to cooperate in monitoring transboundary
shipments to ensure compliance. 3
a. Cooperative Compliance Monitoring
The EPA has conducted occasional border spot checks on the U.S./Canadian
border, working with the U.S. Customs Service and other U.S. federal and state
officials in monitoring transboundary traffic to detect illegal hazardous waste
shipments. These spot checks are usually performed in coordination with Cana-
dian environmental and customs officials, with Canadian officials setting up their
28. Individual facilities within selected geographic areas are targeted for inspection if they present
a high risk of negative impacts on the Great Lakes. High-risk facilities include those with a history
of noncompliance or those that report the release of large quantities of critical pollutants to the Toxics
Release Inventory as required by the Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act
(EPCRA). Great Lakes Enforcement Strategy, supra note 21.
29. In a recent settlement of a multimedia enforcement case brought as part of a targeted geo-
graphic initiative, the defendant agreed to pay civil penalties of US$3.5 million for its violations
and to conduct corrective action to remediate environmental releases for which it was directly responsi-
ble. In addition, the facility agreed to undertake US$26 million worth of supplemental environmental
projects. The defendant will spend US$7 million on facility audits and plant improvements to prevent
pollution and US$19 million to remediate contaminated sediments in a region identified as an Area
of Concern under the GLWQA. United States v. Inland Steel Corp., No. H-90-0328 (N.D. Ind.)
(Consent Decree, lodged Mar. 9, 1993; entered June 10, 1993); see Great Lakes Enforcement
Strategy, supra note 24.
30. Agreement Concerning the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Waste, Oct. 28, 1986,
U.S.-Can., T.I.A.S. No. 11,099.
31. Id. arts. 5, 7.
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own corresponding spot checks or with U.S. and Canadian officials participating
as observers at the others' border crossing.
In 1989, the EPA enforcement officials learned through press reports of an
alleged criminal conspiracy to export PCBs and hazardous waste, mixed in fuels,
from New York to Canada. The press articles alleged that these contaminated
fuels had been sold to customers in Southern Ontario and Quebec. The perpetrators
allegedly were profiting both from diluting their fuels with hazardous waste and
then paying tax on only the undiluted fuel. This incident led to increased, direct
communication between the countries' environmental agencies. Both countries
stepped up their compliance monitoring efforts. To facilitate monitoring, Canada
limited the number of ports of entry available for such shipments, and Canadian
federal and provincial officials did extensive sampling of shipments to investigate
the allegations.32
U.S. and Canadian officials communicate regularly over the processing of
hazardous waste export notifications, which often leads to cooperation in investi-
gating suspected violations.
3. Other Areas of Cooperation: Case-Specific Matters and Consultations
An increasing number of circumstances have arisen involving the need for
cooperation in investigating specific cases in other contexts. For example, the
EPA has encountered a number of cases requiring service of complaints or infor-
mation requests on Canadian companies under the U.S. Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation and Liability Act 34 and the Toxic Substances
Control Act. 3' These requests have provided the two countries the basis for
increased experience in procedures for requesting foreign assistance in litigation
of civil enforcement cases.
Although no formal structure exists for U.S. /Canadian environmental enforce-
ment cooperation, environmental enforcement officials of the two countries con-
sult regularly. Canadian officials attended a recent meeting of the EPA regional
and headquarters enforcement officials to discuss enforcement of transboundary
waste regulations, each country sharing information on how it tracks transbound-
ary waste shipments.36 In September 1993, enforcement officials of the EPA and
Environment Canada (Canada's federal environmental protection ministry) met
in Ottawa to develop a mutual understanding of each country's system of environ-
mental regulation and enforcement. Similar meetings have taken place between
the EPA and the Ontario Ministry of the Environment in Toronto.
32. See Bromm, supra note 10.
33. Id.
34. 42 U.S.C.A §§ 9601-9675 (West 1983 & Supp. 1995).
35. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601-2692 (West 1982 & Supp. 1995).
36. Bromm, supra note 10.
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IV. A New Trilateral Enforcement Network
NAFTA's environmental side agreement, the NAAEC, provides a new legal
and institutional context within which to build North America's environmental
enforcement network and supplement existing bilateral activities. The agreement
creates the North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC),
a unique new institution that conducts cooperative enforcement activities and
promotes effective enforcement of each nation's environmental laws. The com-
mission consists of a governing council of cabinet-level (or equivalent) officials
from each party; a secretariat that provides technical, administrative, and opera-
tional support to the council; and a Joint Public Advisory Committee.37
A. OBLIGATION TO EFFECTIVELY ENFORCE
The agreement's centerpiece is its obligation that each country "effectively
enforce its environmental laws and regulations through appropriate governmental
action." 38 Article 5 gives examples of possible elements of an effective enforce-
ment program that would constitute appropriate governmental action. 39 These
possible elements include: appointing and training inspectors; monitoring compli-
ance and investigating suspected violations, including through on-site inspections;
seeking assurances of voluntary compliance and compliance agreements; publicly
releasing noncompliance information; issuing bulletins or other periodic state-
ments on enforcement procedures; promoting environmental audits; requiring
record keeping and reporting; providing or encouraging mediation and arbitration
services; using licenses, permits, or authorizations; initiating, in a timely manner,
judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative proceedings to seek appropriate sanc-
tions or remedies for violations of its environmental laws and regulations, with
these sanctions and remedies taking into consideration, among other things, the
economic benefit derived from the violation by the violator; providing for search,
seizure, or detention; and issuing administrative orders, including orders of a
preventative, creative, or emergency nature.
The establishment of the obligation of each country to effectively enforce its
environmental laws has broken new ground in the developing regime of interna-
tional environmental law. However, the parties took account of the variety of
possible methods for implementing an effective enforcement program in negotiat-
ing this innovative concept. The resulting agreement therefore provides substan-
tial flexibility to the parties in selecting appropriate tools in the design of their
own enforcement programs. Rather than setting forth precise standards for de-
termining the effectiveness of each country's enforcement actions, the agreement
37. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, supra note 1, arts. 8, 9, 11,
16.
38. Id. art. 5(1).
39. Id.
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leaves this level of detail to future development. Therefore, precise guidance for
measuring the effectiveness of a country's enforcement program is likely to evolve
through cooperative efforts of the parties to improve their programs and to report
enforcement results.40 Case-by-case resolution of individual disputes among the
parties alleging ineffective enforcement may also contribute to defining the scope
of the obligation.
The agreement also requires each party to ensure that enforcement proceedings
are available to sanction or remedy violations of that party's environmental laws
and regulations. Sanctions and remedies for environmental violations must take
into consideration the nature and gravity of the violation, any economic benefit
derived from the violation by the violator, the economic condition of the violator,
and other relevant factors. Possible sanctions and remedies include compliance
agreements, fines, imprisonment, injunctions, the closure of facilities, and the
cost of containing or cleaning up pollution.41
B. SANCTIONS FOR ENFORCEMENT FAILURE
For the first time in an international environmental agreement, the obligation
of each country to effectively enforce its environmental laws is backed by the
possibility of sanctions. A party complaining of a persistent failure of effective
enforcement by another party may request a special session of the council to
seek resolution of the dispute. If the matter cannot be resolved, the council may
establish an arbitral panel empowered to make findings of fact, determinations
as to a persistent pattern of failure to effectively enforce environmental laws,
and recommendations for remedial action. Failure to implement a satisfactory
remedy may lead to imposition of monetary sanctions that, in the case of the
United States and Mexico, may be recouped through trade sanctions if the party
does not pay the monetary assessment.42 In Canada, the monetary assessment
may be recouped through the Canadian national courts.4 3
The dispute resolution procedures laid out in the agreement ensure that the
parties will have ample opportunities to resolve the dispute through consultation
and negotiation. Thus, while establishing the potential for monetary and trade
sanctions as a response to ineffective enforcement, the agreement encourages
such disputes to be resolved (and sanctions to be avoided) through cooperation
in developing and implementing a satisfactory plan for improving enforcement.
The agreement also provides an avenue for public complaints that a party has
failed to effectively enforce its environmental laws. Articles 14 and 15 allow
nongovernmental organizations and other persons to petition the secretariat to
investigate allegations that a party is failing to effectively enforce its environmen-
40. See infra part IV.C.
41. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, supra note 1, art. 5(2), (3).
42. Id. arts. 22-36.
43. Id. annex 36A.
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tal laws. Upon instructions from the council, the secretariat will prepare a factual
record and may conduct its own investigation in preparing such a record. The
factual record may be made available to the public upon approval of the council.44
The procedures governing public complaints to the secretariat do not automati-
cally invoke the formal dispute resolution process that leads to monetary or
trade sanctions; only a party to the agreement may seek the initiation of arbitral
proceedings. Nonetheless, the agreement provides the public with a novel avenue
for exposing, and pressuring the governments to redress, shortcomings in their
enforcement efforts. The parties retain the option of resolving problems high-
lighted by the secretariat's fact-finding activities through cooperation or by initiat-
ing formal dispute resolution procedures.
C. ENFORCEMENT COOPERATION UNDER THE CEC
The CEC serves a dual function. In addition to providing a forum for dispute
resolution and investigations of claims that a party has failed to effectively enforce
its environmental laws, the commission is also charged with promoting coopera-
tion in environmental enforcement. Article 10(4) of the agreement requires the
CEC Council of Ministers to encourage effective enforcement by each party of
its environmental laws and regulations, compliance with those laws and regula-
tions, and technical cooperation among the parties. 45 Under article 12, the secre-
tariat must prepare an annual report that includes data on each of the party's
enforcement activities and actions taken to ensure effective enforcement of its
environmental laws.46
The obligation for effective enforcement and the possibility of public scrutiny
and monetary and trade sanctions increases the importance of enforcement cooper-
ation as a means of ensuring and demonstrating the effectiveness of each country's
environmental enforcement program. Thus, the CEC will likely play a major role
not just in arbitrating disputes, but also in encouraging increasing sophistication in
bilateral and multilateral enforcement cooperation. Active promotion of enforce-
ment cooperation by the commission will help to minimize the frequency of claims
of lax enforcement and the likelihood that such claims will result in sanctions.
V. Future Evolution of the North American and Western Hemisphere
Environmental Enforcement Network
Although environmental enforcement cooperation between the United States
and Mexico and the United States and Canada has grown, the current climate
provides new opportunities for strengthening these cooperative links. This section
examines these opportunities within the suggested components of an environmen-
44. Id. arts. 14, 15.
45. Id. art. 10(4).
46. Id. art. 12.
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tal enforcement network, consistent with the analytical framework set out in part
II of this article.
A. INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR COOPERATION
1. Trilateral Framework
A trilateral institutional framework for North America's environmental en-
forcement cooperation network can be provided by the newly established CEC.47
The CEC provides a forum for developing an active agenda of enforcement
cooperation. Indeed, a vigorous program of trilateral enforcement cooperation
may be the best way to minimize the use of the agreement's dispute resolution
procedures to address complaints of ineffective enforcement.
In early 1995, the CEC's council members established a standing North Ameri-
can enforcement and compliance work group, with representation by environmen-
tal enforcement officials of each country. The work group will provide a forum
to coordinate cooperative activities in environmental enforcement and compliance
promotion. To ensure each party's commitment to implementing agreed-upon
priorities for enforcement cooperation, the council could adopt a work plan of
specific projects, developed annually by the work group.
2. Bilateral Structures
The parties to the NAAEC will need to define the commission's relationship
to bilateral cooperative enforcement activities. The North American enforcement
work group could serve a role in encouraging cooperative bilateral enforcement
initiatives, reporting on the bilateral cooperative enforcement activities of the
parties, and identifying bilateral activities that could benefit from expansion to
a trilateral level.
The trilateral institutional structure provided by the commission can be
strengthened through existing, new, or revised bilateral arrangements. Such bilat-
eral arrangements can be structured to take into account the different organiza-
tional structures for environmental enforcement within each of the countries of
North America.
For example, Mexico's environmental enforcement structure is currently more
centralized than the U.S. structure, which relies heavily on state enforcement
backed up by federal civil judicial, criminal, and administrative enforcement
tools implemented both regionally and nationally. As a result, bilateral arrange-
ments for enforcement cooperation between the United States and Mexico need
to account for Mexico's relatively centralized decision making while ensuring
appropriate regional and state participation consistent with the U.S. enforcement
scheme.
The United States and Mexico are discussing the development of an organiza-
47. The emergence of this new trilateral Commission is described supra part IV.
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tional structure for the existing U.S. /Mexican enforcement work group that incor-
porates both a national level work group structure and the creation of regional
subgroups corresponding to the U.S. and Mexican states along the U.S./Mexican
border. The regional subgroups can play a key role in identifying and implement-
ing priorities for cooperative interaction to address geographically localized trans-
boundary environmental problems. The subgroups can serve as a forum to allow
participation by states, as well as regional offices of federal agencies involved
in environmental protection.
The national level of the U.S./Mexican enforcement work group can identify
priorities that cut across regional lines, or it can participate in regional subgroup
priority setting where national level interests are uniquely at stake. The relation-
ship between the national level work group and its regional subgroups could be
flexible enough, however, to account for the different degrees of centralization
in Mexico and the United States. For instance, the Mexican component of the
subgroup might suggest local priorities for adoption by central decision makers
and then implement those decisions. In contrast, the actual priority-setting deci-
sion might be made in the United States at the more decentralized subgroup level.
In the future, the United States and Canada could explore similar formal mecha-
nisms to engage in bilateral enforcement cooperation. A work group structure
at the bilateral level, focused on cooperative priority setting and enforcement
targeting, might supplement the trilateral program of enforcement cooperation
under the CEC. Canada's enforcement regime is less centralized than that of the
United States, with a very limited federal role and strong reliance on provincial
enforcement authorities. Therefore, arrangements between the United States and
Canada would need to account for Canada's relative decentralization of authority
for determining and implementing priorities. The work group might be structured
to allow maximum participation by states and provinces, while allowing the
federal authorities an appropriate role in determining and implementing coopera-
tive enforcement priorities.
3. Domestic Structure: Interagency Partnership
Within the United States, expanding the network of cooperation to involve
other federal and state agencies more actively could improve enforcement cooper-
ation with the other North American countries. Such interagency cooperation
may occur through enhanced coordination in the field. For example, the concept
of a multiagency task force to investigate transboundary shipments violations,
experimented with in San Diego County, California, may serve as a model for
other task forces along both the U.S./Mexican and U.S. /Canadian borders.
Interagency cooperation could also be improved through continued develop-
ment of interagency electronic communication links. For example, the EPA is
working with U.S. Customs to examine the possibility of an automated interface
that would provide for instantaneous exchange of compliance monitoring data,
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and is exploring with industry the electronic transmittal of hazardous waste mani-
fest data on a voluntary, pilot basis.48
Building domestic interagency enforcement links could be undertaken in a
manner that promotes involvement and cooperation of corresponding agencies
in the other countries as well. For example, increased bilateral coordination
between customs services, state and local governments, federal criminal investi-
gative units, and other agencies involved in environmental enforcement may
supplement the increased coordination of the national environmental authorities
for improving enforcement.
B. STRATEGIC PRIORITY SETTING AND TARGETING
By emphasizing the development of cooperative enforcement strategies for
problems of transboundary concern, countries can increase the sophistication of
their efforts to ensure compliance. The United States, Mexico, and Canada could
consider increased cooperation in implementing targeted enforcement initiatives.
Such initiatives could be based on mutually determined strategic priorities, but
implemented with each country conducting inspections and taking responsive
enforcement actions in its own territory. Although this type of cooperation has
great promise, its usage in North America has been limited. The countries might
actively discuss how to accomplish such cooperative initiatives in a manner that
does not compromise sovereignty.
Bilateral initiatives may be targeted at specific, geographic-based problems
of transboundary pollution as a means of protecting sensitive populations or
ecosystems. For such geographic initiatives, strong reliance could be placed
on the regional, state or provincial, and local authorities in identifying priority
problems of common concern. Efforts of the United States and Canada to protect
the Great Lakes, for example, could be further enhanced by expanding each
country's unilateral enforcement activities through the implementation of cooper-
ative strategies to target enforcement actions toward problems of regional con-
cern. Similarly, a number of serious, local environmental problems in the sister
cities in the U.S./Mexican border area and the Gulf of Mexico might be addressed
through cooperative, geographically targeted enforcement initiatives.
Bilateral, or even trilateral, cooperative enforcement initiatives may also be
targeted at common environmental problems that do not necessarily present geo-
graphic risks of transboundary pollution. Cooperative targeting of common indus-
try sectors, pollutants, or analogous regulatory requirements could serve a key
role in ensuring the level playing field required for free trade among the sovereign
nations of North America. Enforcement of domestic laws implementing interna-
48. See Bromm, supra note 10.
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tional obligations, including the Basel Convention49 or the Montreal Protocol,5 °
are also prime areas for cooperative targeted initiatives.
In targeting priority problems for cooperative enforcement activities, the coun-
tries should make every effort to integrate pollution prevention as a primary goal
of targeted enforcement activities. This goal could be pursued by each of the
parties in a number of ways. Environmental inspectors could play an important
role in promoting pollution prevention that exceeds regulatory standards by dis-
seminating information on prevention approaches to facilities inspected. Pollution
prevention goals could be pursued by seeking to negotiate case settlements and
compliance agreements with facilities that require changes in facility procedures
or management practices that reduce pollution, even where such changes are not
specifically required by regulations.
C. COOPERATIVE COMPLIANCE PROMOTION
A particularly ripe area for expanded bilateral and trilateral enforcement coop-
eration is promotion of voluntary compliance. The United States, Mexico, and
Canada might be able to enhance the effectiveness of their voluntary compliance
promotion efforts by collectively reaching out to multinational corporations op-
erating in two or more of the countries. Cooperative compliance promotion might
be linked to efforts to encourage industry to undertake pollution prevention efforts
that go beyond the minimum required to achieve regulatory compliance. Recog-
nizing the potential for trilateral cooperation in this area, the EPA and PROFEPA
invited Canada and the CEC to participate in industry seminars and intergovern-
mental consultations on environmental auditing and voluntary compliance,
planned for the fall of 1995 and early 1996.
The United States, Mexico, and Canada might collaborate bilaterally in encour-
aging U.S. and Canadian corporations operating in Mexico to participate in Mexi-
co's audit program, and through promoting voluntary compliance and pollution
prevention for the corporations' operations in the other countries. Such voluntary
compliance efforts might be tied to the cooperative enforcement targeting initia-
tives described above. For example, while the inspectors of each country take
enforcement action within their territorial jurisdiction against cooperatively
agreed-to targets, the authorities of each country might also join forces to promote
voluntary compliance and pollution prevention in the targeted geographic region,
industry, or group of industries using targeted chemicals or subject to targeted
regulatory requirements.
49. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and
Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 649.
50. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, done Sept. 16, 1987, 26
I.L.M. 1541.
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D. COOPERATIVE COMPLIANCE MONITORING
The PA/PROFEPA effort to develop HAZTRAKS, the binational tracking
system for transboundary hazardous waste shipments, represents an innovative
approach to building both countries' compliance monitoring capacity through
cooperation. The United States and Mexico have committed to continue to work
toward full utilization of HAZTRAKS as a tool for detecting potential transbound-
ary shipment violations. Such work will seek full cooperation of the customs
services and local environmental authorities of both countries in obtaining compli-
ance data for the tracking system. In addition, the countries are working toward
the development of computer interfaces to allow direct electronic transmission
of compliance data by the regulated community and real-time sharing of data
between the two countries.
In early discussions of the CEC North American enforcement work group,
the United States, Mexico, Canada, and the CEC secretariat expressed interest
in exploring expansion of the tracking system concept to include hazardous waste
shipments between the United States and Canada, and between Mexico and Can-
ada, in order to facilitate enforcement of the Basel Convention. 51 The countries
also might explore development of similar systems to track transboundary move-
ments of ozone-depleting chemicals to assist in implementation of the Montreal
Protocol.52 Similar possibilities exist for cooperation in development of a compu-
terized tracking capability to monitor compliance with import and export require-
ments for toxic chemical products and pesticides,
Moreover, the countries might expand the exchange of data on inputs and
emissions from industrial processes. Data collected on chemical exports and
imports, for example, may provide useful information for targeting high-risk
industries in the importing country. Such efforts may require reliance on data
collected by the customs services of the countries involved, particularly in the
absence of specific environmental requirements for tracking raw chemical product
shipments. Some of this information may be considered confidential due to its
proprietary (trade secret) or enforcement-sensitive nature in one or more of the
countries involved. Procedures for exchanging and protecting confidential infor-
mation might be developed at the trilateral level within the CEC as well as at
the bilateral and domestic levels to ensure the free intergovernmental exchange
of such information without compromising its confidential nature.
E. COOPERATION ON SPECIFIC ENFORCEMENT CASES
As trade between the countries increases, and the countries cooperate to en-
hance their compliance monitoring capacities, there likely will be an increase in
51. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and
Their Disposal, supra note 45.
52. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, supra note 46.
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the number of violations detected involving transboundary impacts and situations
in which evidence of a violation in one country is found in another. In addition,
implementation of the Basel Convention will focus attention on actions to address
the environmental harm caused by illegal hazardous waste exports, through repa-
triation or alternative sound management of the wastes in question.
Recognizing these likely developments, the countries of North America will
need to ensure the existence of clear lines of communication for seeking coopera-
tive assistance in individual cases. The bilateral Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties
that the United States has entered into with Mexico and Canada53 provide a
framework of procedures for cooperation in investigating criminal violations.
Similarly, the Hague Conventions on Service of Process and on Taking of Evi-
dence Abroad54 provide multilateral procedural frameworks for cooperation in
initiating and investigating cases where civil enforcement mechanisms are em-
ployed. These formal procedures can be supplemented, however, with informal
relationships and understandings. In the United States, most of the investigatory
work in individual cases is carried out by regional offices of the federal govern-
ment or state environmental agencies. Accordingly, the links for case-specific
cooperation might be developed at this level, such as through the regional sub-
groups of bilateral enforcement work groups.
F. SHARING EXPERIENCES TO BUILD ENFORCEMENT CAPACITY
1. Consultation on Laws and Policies
The CEC may serve as a trilateral forum for exchanges among the United
States, Mexico, and Canada of laws, regulations, significant enforcement cases,
court or administrative decisions, and significant regulatory actions. Similarly,
the CEC could promote consultations among the parties regarding their respective
enforcement policies, practices, and procedures. In addition to utilizing the CEC
as a trilateral forum for such exchanges, the parties may benefit from increased
routine bilateral interaction and consultations regarding their environmental laws
and enforcement policies.
2. Training and Technical Assistance
The parties might seek opportunities to build joint training and capacity-
building exercises into cooperative enforcement initiatives. The countries could
decide to target a particular pollutant of concern for enforcement responses in their
53. Treaty on Cooperation for Mutual Legal Assistance, Dec. 9, 1987, U.S.-Mex., 24 I.L.M.
443; Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Mar. 18, 1985, U.S.-Can., 24 I.L.M.
1092.
54. Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Com-
mercial Matters, done Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, 658 U.N.T.S. 163; Convention on the Taking
of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T.
2555, 847 U.N.T.S 231.
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respective jurisdictions. In carrying out inspections to implement these targeting
decisions, one country might invite inspectors from another country to serve as
observers for the purpose of training. Similarly, focusing on a pollutant or industry
of concern would provide the countries an opportunity to develop mutually their
compliance monitoring capabilities through pooling of pollution sampling and
analytical capabilities, or by using the targeted initiative as an opportunity to
enhance sharing of data on chemical inputs and releases for the industry or pollut-
ant of concern.
Other training opportunities may be pursued as well. The United States and
Mexico may work to enhance their multimedia inspector training program and
to involve Canada in the program. Goals for this program could include training
course improvements to integrate industry-specific enforcement, pollution pre-
vention information, and provision of train-the-trainer courses to allow each
country to benefit fully from in-house training capacities. In addition to inspector
training, the countries may wish to consider cooperating in training of enforce-
ment policy personnel, utilizing the Principles of Environmental Enforcement
course that the United States has taught in several countries and that is the basis
of case study exercises now being conducted.
A trilateral training and technical assistance program might involve each coun-
try assisting the others in areas where it has developed special expertise. For
example, while the United States might concentrate on inspector and policy-maker
training, Mexico could provide training to the United States and Canada in con-
ducting environmental audits, and Canada might provide training in promoting
voluntary compliance. Other possible areas for cooperative exercises include
training in the development and implementation of penalty policies to recoup the
economic benefit of noncompliance; technical assistance in enforcement case
tracking; technical assistance in enhancement of laboratory capacity for analyzing
samples taken by inspectors; training in good laboratory practice techniques; and
technical assistance and training for integrating pollution prevention goals in
enforcement and compliance promotion activities.
G. SHARING INFORMATION ON ENFORCEMENT RESULTS
Although the United States and Mexico initiated bilateral exchanges of enforce-
ment statistics to respond to public interest during the NAFTA debate, such
exchange now is memorialized on a trilateral level. The CEC secretariat must
develop an annual report with information on the effectiveness of each country's
enforcement programs. The parties thus will be required to report on their enforce-
ment accomplishments to the secretariat, including information on inspections,
fines and other sanctions, and the results of enforcement actions in achieving
compliance with environmental laws and cleanup of pollution. Additionally, bilat-
eral cooperation may continue for exchanging information on regional enforce-
ment activities, particular in te U.S./Mexican border area.
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The CEC council's cooperative enforcement activities could include developing
ideas on how to measure results of enforcement programs. A key challenge
will be addressing the comparability of enforcement statistics collected by the
countries, each of which adopts different methods of measuring enforcement
activities and utilizes different enforcement tools to achieve results. For instance,
Mexico publicizes detailed data on the number of inspections it undertakes and
resulting facility shutdowns. Canada has compiled statistics on numbers of inspec-
tions, investigations, warnings, prosecutions, and convictions. In the United
States national statistics are readily available on enforcement cases initiated and
monetary penalties obtained. Compilation of national inspection statistics, how-
ever, is currently a more difficult task due to decentralization of inspection author-
ity among separate programs in the states and the EPA regional offices. In addi-
tion, significant variations exist between countries in terms of the frequency with
which different enforcement responses such as shutdowns, criminal prosecutions,
and civil prosecutions are employed. Due to such differences, meaningful compar-
isons of enforcement activities among the three countries may require mutual
determination of the key data elements and improvements over time in the measur-
ing systems each uses.
Moreover, reporting only on quantitative enforcement activities such as inspec-
tions realized, cases brought, or penalties collected does not provide a complete
measure of the actual results of enforcement in improving the environment. A
cooperative dialogue on measures of enforcement success may lead to develop-
ment of new measures that will account for the behavioral and environmental
benefits that result from enforcement action.
H. COMMUNICATIONS STRATEGY
International coordination in public communication of enforcement activity
provides great promise in deterring noncompliance. Coordinated announcements
of cooperative activities also provide the countries with an opportunity to demon-
strate that, while the countries are cooperating on enforcement, they are doing
so within the principles of sovereignty and comity. This technique, however,
has only been used to date in North America to a very limited extent. Successful
use of this technique requires the countries involved to agree to the means, timing,
and content of a public announcement. The North American enforcement network
might further explore the use of cooperative public communications to demon-
strate the consequences of enforcement cooperation. The network could provide
a means for mutually agreeing on communication plans in advance of the coopera-
tive activity to be announced.
I. A WESTERN HEMISPHERE ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT NETWORK
On December 9-11, 1994, the presidents of the democratic nations of the
Western Hemisphere met in Miami for the Summit of the Americas. At the
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Summit, a plan of action was announced calling for a new hemispheric partnership
for pollution prevention. The plan of action specifically identifies initial substan-
tive priorities including pesticide misuse and contamination from lead in gasoline
and other sources. The plan calls for the following actions: (1) international
organizations such as the Inter-American Development, the Pan-American Health
Organization, and the Organization of American States to play a major role
in funding and implementing partnership activities; (2) cooperative efforts in
developing and improving environmental enforcement as a key aspect of the
sound environmental management required to ensure sustainable development;
(3) strengthening of implementation and enforcement of environmental protection
frameworks, both through individual government action and through intergovern-
mental cooperation, to facilitate information exchange, technical cooperation,
and capacity building. In essence, then, the Partnership for Pollution Prevention
envisions a Western hemisphere network of cooperation in environmental en-
forcement.
Prior to the Summit, on October 12, 1994, the governments of Central America
announced a new Alliance for Sustainable Development, a regional strategy aimed
at ensuring that development in Central America would be sustainable in political,
economic, social, cultural, and environmental terms. The leaders of the Central
American countries invited the international community to join them in achieving
the goals of the alliance. At the Summit in Miami, the United States accepted
this invitation, and along with the Central American governments, issued the
Conjunta Centroamerica-USA (CONCAUSA) Declaration, declaring their po-
litical commitment to cooperation in achieving the goals of the alliance.55 The
CONCAUSA Declaration includes an action plan that contemplates cooperation
between the United States and its Central American partners in establishing a
network of cooperation to promote and enforce compliance with environmental
legislation.
The EPA has taken initial steps in implementing the Western Hemisphere
partnership and its participation in CONCAUSA. Among other things, the EPA
has initiated development of a directory of contacts of environmental legal and
enforcement officials and experts throughout the hemisphere, to support a hemi-
sphere-wide network. In July 1995, the EPA provided its Principles of Environ-
mental Enforcement course to environmental officials of Chile, the first proposed
South American partner in a free trade agreement of the Americas. The EPA also
has begun developing a training course on the development and implementation
of environmental legislation and regulations, to supplement other international
training modules.
North America's evolving network of environmental enforcement cooperation
can provide a ready model for the growth of similar regional and subregional
55. Conjunta Centroamerica-USA (CONCAUSA) Declaration, Miami, Florida, Dec. 10, 1994.
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networks throughout the Western Hemisphere, which would link together in a
hemisphere-wide network of cooperation.
VI. Conclusion: Vision for a North American Enforcement
Network and Beyond
With respect for national sovereignty as the defining context, the nations of
North America are building a cooperative enforcement network that enhances the
effectiveness of each country's domestic enforcement and compliance program. A
variety of tools are available, including cooperation in individual cases; coopera-
tion in training and developing technological tools that enhance compliance moni-
toring capabilities; cooperation in promoting voluntary compliance; conscious
strategic collaboration in setting priorities for enforcement activity; selection of
targets for enforcement action; and communication of enforcement results to
maximize their deterrent effect. The evolving network will work best by building
partnerships of cooperation, both between the countries of North America and
among the multiplicity of national and local agencies contributing to environmen-
tal enforcement.
The resulting cooperative efforts may strengthen environmental enforcement
as a tool for encouraging pollution prevention, addressing sensitive ecosystems,
and promoting environmental justice. These experiences in building a network
of environmental enforcement cooperation in North America may suggest similar
opportunities for developing a broader environmental enforcement network
throughout the Western Hemisphere, particularly as the free trade experiment
in North America is extended throughout the Americas.
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